Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation by Wallach, Arian D. et al.
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Wallach, Arian D., Batavia, Chelsea, Bekoff, Marc, Alexander, Shelley, Baker, Liv,
Ben‐Ami,  Dror,  Boronyak,  Louise,  Cardilin,  Adam  P.  A.,  Carmel,  Yohay,  Celermajer,
Danielle, Coghlan, Simon, Dahdal, Yara, Gomez, Jonatan J., Kaplan, Gisela, Keynan, Oded,
Khalilieh,  Anton,  Kopnina,  Helen,  Lynn,  William  S.,  Narayanan,  Yamini,  Riley,  Sophie,
Santiago‐Ávila, Francisco J., Yanco, Esty, Zemanova, Miriam A. and Ramp, Daniel (2020)
Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation. Conservation Biology, 34
(5). pp. 1097-1106. ISSN 0888-8892 
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell
URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13494 <https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13494>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link:
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/47267/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users
to access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on
NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies
of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes
without  prior  permission  or  charge,  provided  the  authors,  title  and  full  bibliographic
details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The
content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is
available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the
published version of  the research,  please visit  the publisher’s website (a subscription
may be required.)
                        
Essay
Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate
conservation
Arian D. Wallach ,1
∗
Chelsea Batavia ,2 Marc Bekoff,3 Shelley Alexander,4 Liv Baker,5
Dror Ben-Ami,1,6 Louise Boronyak,1,7 Adam P. A. Cardilin,8 Yohay Carmel,9 Danielle Celermajer,10
Simon Coghlan,11 Yara Dahdal,12 Jonatan J. Gomez,13 Gisela Kaplan,14 Oded Keynan,15,6
Anton Khalilieh,12 Helen Kopnina ,16 William S. Lynn ,17 Yamini Narayanan,18 Sophie Riley,1,19
Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila ,20 Esty Yanco ,1 Miriam A. Zemanova ,1 and Daniel Ramp1
1Centre for Compassionate Conservation, Faculty of Science, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia
2Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331, U.S.A.
3Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, U.S.A.
4Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada
5Animal Behavior and Conservation Program, Hunter College CUNY, New York, NY U.S.A.
6Compassionate Conservation Middle East, Steinhardt Museum of Natural History, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
7Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia
8Faculty of Science Engineering and Built Environment, Deakin University, Waurn Ponds, VIC 3216, Australia
9Division of Environmental, Water and Agricultural Engineering, Technion Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 32000, Israel
10Department of Sociology and Social Policy, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006,
Australia
11School of Computing and Information Systems, Melbourne School of Engineering, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC
3010, Australia
12Nature Palestine, West Bank, Palestine
13Departamento de Ciencias Básicas, Universidad Nacional de Luján, Rutas 5 y 7, Luján, 6700, Argentina
14School of Science & Technology, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia
15Dead Sea & Arava Science Centre, Central Arava Branch, Hatzeva, Israel
16The Hague University of Applied Sciences, International Business, Johanna Westerdijkplein 75, EN Den Haag, 2521, the Nether-
lands
17George Perkins Marsh Institute, Clark University, Worcester, MA 01710, U.S.A.
18School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC 3125, Australia
19Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia
20Carnivore Coexistence Lab, Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706,
U.S.A.
Abstract: Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity
should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming
animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection;
conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We
used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation.
We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that
humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate
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conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings
as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated
merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood
to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other
species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation
was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize
nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space.
Keywords: animal ethics, biodiversity, conservation ethics, human exceptionalism, nativism
Reconocimiento de la Calidad de Persona en los Animales dentro de la Conservación Compasiva
Resumen: La conservación compasiva está basada en la posición ética que parte de que las acciones tomadas
para proteger a la biodiversidad deberían estar dirigidas por la compasión por todos los seres sintientes. Los
críticos de esta postura argumentan que hay tres razones nucleares por las que el daño a los animales es
aceptable dentro de los programas de conservación: el principal motivo de la conservación es la protección de la
biodiversidad; la conservación ya es compasiva con los animales; y la conservación debería priorizar la compasión
hacia los humanos. Usamos un análisis de argumentos para aclarar los valores y la lógica subyacentes al debate en
torno a la conservación compasiva. Encontramos que el rechazo a la conservación compasiva es una expresión de
la excepcionalidad humana, la visión de que los humanos están en un nivel categóricamente separado y de mayor
moral que todas las demás especies. Por el contrario, los conservacionistas compasivos creen que la conservación
debería expandir su comunidad moral al reconocer a todos los seres sintientes como personas. La calidad de
persona, en un sentido ético, implica que el individuo merece respeto y no debería ser tratado solamente como
un medio para otros fines. Si hablamos desde fundamentos científicos y éticos, existen muy buenas razones para
extender la calidad de persona a todos los animales sintientes, particularmente en la conservación. La exclusión
moral o la subordinación de los miembros de otras especies justifica la continua manipulación y explotación de
los seres vivos, la justa razón por la que necesitamos de la conservación desde el principio. La aceptación de la
compasión nos puede ayudar a desmantelar la excepcionalidad humana, a reconocer la calidad de persona no
humana y a navegar un espacio moral más expansivo.



























Western culture traditionally regarded humans as excep-
tional among all animals (Rose 2011). This belief was
challenged by scientific and philosophical breakthroughs
confirming Charles Darwin’s view that “there is no fun-
damental difference” between humans and other animals
(Darwin 1871). Today, it is beyond dispute that many
animals are sentient beings (Low et al. 2012; Bekoff &
Pierce 2017). Much has changed since the 1960s, when
primatologist Jane Goodall was castigated for ascribing
chimpanzees with personalities and feelings (Goodall
1998). Despite this, even those nonhuman animals with
recognized mental, emotional, and social sophistication
(such as mammals, birds, and cephalopods) are still
readily treated as means to human ends (Midgley 1985).
Conservation is no exception (Wallach et al. 2018).
Although conservation was founded on a uniquely
expansive ethic that recognizes the intrinsic value of
the living world (Batavia & Nelson 2017), nonhuman
animals do not necessarily meet a better fate in the hands
of conservationists than in any other hands (Ramp &
Bekoff 2015; Wallach et al. 2018). Conservationists often
embody deep concern, even love, for wildlife and nature.
Yet, this can be a “violent love” (Srinivasan & Kasturiran-
gan 2017). Systemic harm of sentient animals in conser-
vation is enabled by 3 ethical orientations: collectivism
(or holism)—the belief that species matter more than
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individuals; instrumentalism—the treatment of an
entity as a means to an end; and nativism—the view
that populations established by humans are unnatural
(Wallach et al. 2018). These orientations drive conser-
vation practices that use “authoritarian management
and control measures” (Bhattacharyya & Larson 2014)
and that regard nonhuman animals as “instances of
their type” (Vucetich & Nelson 2007) and as “killable”
(Haraway 2013) “objects” (Nussbaum 1995).
Compassionate conservation, in contrast, recognizes
that the interests and agency of all sentient beings should
be protected in conservation practice (Ramp & Bekoff
2015; Wallach et al. 2018). In other words, sentient be-
ings are persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies
an entity is owed respect and should not be treated as a
means to other ends (Midgley 1985; Dayan 2018). Many
traditions (including hunting-based cultures) have long
understood the world as animated with multitudes of
persons with whom humans form kinship relations (e.g.,
Rose 2011; Hill 2013; Robinson 2014). Western tradition,
however, has largely restricted the notion of personhood
to humans, an expression of human exceptionalism
that maintains humans as a categorically separate and
inherently superior class of being (Plumwood 1993). It is
not our purpose to dispute this view, per se, but to offer
an alternative; namely, all sentient beings are persons
when viewed through the lens of compassion.
The proposition that compassion for sentient beings
should inform and where necessary redirect con-
servation goals and practices has generated intense
debate. Recently, a series of critiques of compassionate
conservation unfolded in Conservation Biology and
included a Conservation Focus “Debating Compassion in
Conservation Science” (2019, Volume 33, Issue 4). We
considered the main statements made in opposition to
compassionate conservation in 5 essays that responded
to Wallach et al. (2015) and Wallach et al. (2018):
Russell et al. (2016), Driscoll and Watson (2019),
Hampton et al. (2019), Hayward et al. (2019), and
Oommen et al. (2019) (hereafter critiques or critics).
We condensed the critiques into 3 core reasons to reject
compassionate conservation and support lethal and
invasive conservation practices: the primary purpose
(raison d’être) of conservation is biodiversity protection;
conservation is already compassionate to animals; and
conservation should prioritize compassion to humans
(Table 1). We developed these reasons into formal
arguments, which allowed us to clarify the values
and logic underlying the debate around compassionate
conservation. Formal arguments are composed of a set of
premises (P) leading to a conclusion (C). An argument is
sound when it meets 2 conditions: it is valid, meaning its
conclusion necessarily follows from its premises, and its
premises are true or appropriate, meaning the empirical
premises are factually accurate and the ethical premises
are consistently defensible (Hughes et al. 2010).
Response to Claim that the Primary Purpose of
Conservation is Biodiversity Protection
The global conservation community shares the be-
liefs that nature has intrinsic value and the role of
conservation is to enable the flourishing of Earth’s
diversity of life (Sandbrook et al. 2019). However,
precisely which and how living entities should be valued
and protected remain complex and contested ethical
questions. Compassionate conservationists recognize the
intrinsic value of individuals alongside that of ecological
collectives (also, ecological wholes) and call to avoid
deliberately harming sentient beings in conservation
programs (e.g., Ramp & Bekoff 2015; Wallach et al.
2018). Critics respond that there are situations in which
lethal and invasive practices are necessary to protect
biodiversity and prevent extinctions. For example,
Russell et al. (2016) “believe lethal control of invasive
predators is justified when it will reverse [their] negative
impacts… on native species and ecosystems.” The first
line of reasoning invoked to contest compassionate
conservation can be summarized as follows (Table 1):
P1. Conservation actions that harm animals can be nec-
essary to protect biodiversity.
C. Therefore, conservation actions that harm animals can
be appropriate.
Critics tend to focus exclusively on the truthfulness
of P1, assuming that if it can be verified, the conclusion
necessarily follows (e.g., Driscoll & Watson 2019). This
inference is invalid. Although descriptive conclusions
(e.g., elephants are mammals) require only descriptive
or empirical premises, prescriptive conclusions (e.g.,
elephants should be protected) require both descriptive
and prescriptive premises. Thus, P1 by itself does not
lead to C (Nelson et al. 2016). To be valid, the argument
must include at least one ethical premise. For example:
P1. The goal of conservation is to protect biodiversity.
(ethical)
P2. Actions that are necessary to achieve the goal of con-
servation are appropriate. (ethical)
P3. Conservation actions that harm animals can be nec-
essary to protect biodiversity. (empirical)
C. Therefore, conservation actions that harm animals can
be appropriate.
This argument is valid, but additional specifications
are required to more accurately represent the critiques of
compassionate conservation (Table 1). As expressed by
critics, the goal of protecting biodiversity (P1) is usually
limited to the protection of native species (Table 1),
which are considered “of more value to their ecosystems
than non-native species” (Hayward et al. 2019). Addi-
tionally, in P2 and P3, critics do not intend to include
humans among the animals available to be severely
Conservation Biology
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Russell et al. (2016):
“[Preventing] endangered species from going extinct… is the foundation of conservation biology.”
“Restoration of… natural processes is at the core of the duty conservation biologists assume.”
“[T]he goal [of lethal control of introduced species] is to reestablish natural ecological processes.”
Driscoll and Watson (2019):
“We, as conservation scientists, as ethical humans, want to preserve diversity. We want to preserve
function. We want to preserve systems.”
“[Arguments] ruling out culling invasive alien species… [is] squarely in the realm of science denialism.”
Hayward et al. (2019):
“[C]oncern for individual animals… [is appropriate] only to the extent that it is consistent with
landscape-level methods of protecting native biodiversity.”







Russell et al. (2016):
“Where invasive predators are killed to achieve conservation goals, we believe this action can stem
from compassion for all of the ecosystem, its species, the individuals being protected, and the
invasive animals themselves.”
“In some cases, lethal control is the most ethical and compassionate course of action.”
Driscoll and Watson (2019):
“Compassionate conservation is not compassionate.”
Hampton et al. (2019): “[W]hen lethal control is performed [to best practice] animal welfare outcomes
are in most cases superior to alternative management options.”
Hayward et al. (2019):
“Compassion (or, less specifically, concern for individual animal welfare) has already become an
important aspect of best practices in conservation.”
Argument 2
Hampton et al. (2019):
“Under consequentialist approaches, contentious actions, such as killing, are considered ethically
permissible if, when compared with alternative actions, they deliver a better balance of positive
versus negative effects.”
Driscoll and Watson (2019):
“[Suffering associated with introduced species] is distinct from suffering and death of native species in
natural ecosystems that are both an outcome of, and integral to, natural evolutionary processes.”
“The suffering [compassionate conservationists] seek to prevent by adhering to virtue ethics leads to
worse suffering and death.”
Hayward et al. (2019):
“[D]oing no harm to introduced [animals] results in more harm being done to more individual animals.
Yet stopping the lethal control of invasive mammals, despite the inordinate amount of suffering they
inflict on other animals, is a cardinal concern of compassionate conservationists.”
“The methods used by professionals to kill animals for conservation purposes will almost always be





Hampton et al. (2019):
“These positive effects [of killing] may be… [including] desirable outcome for humans through
harvesting, improved quality of drinking water, [and] reduced vehicle collisions.”
Oommen et al. (2019):
“[Compassionate conservation] focuses on the well-being of individual wild animals without adequately
considering the well-being or worldviews of [humans].”
“The practical human costs of overplaying the moral salience of sentience and sapience in nonhuman
animals are non-trivial.”
“[P]rograms that manage entire populations, species, or habitats based on consumptive sustainable use
[should] be supported.”
“[One should consider] the consequences of conservation action on human well-being.”
“Conservationists should not presume that one set of anthropomorphized, culturally specific values is
universally applicable to all and independent of regional factors or local politics”
Conservation Biology
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Table 2. Formal arguments in support of compassionate conservation that arise from the position that all sentient beings are persons.
Critique of compassionate
conservation Response Formal argument for compassionate conservation
The primary purpose of
conservation is biodiversity
protection.
Agreed, but biodiversity includes
all life.
P1. The goal of conservation is to protect biodiversity.
P2. Biodiversity includes all life.




Not according to the definition
of compassion used with
regard to persons.
P1. Conservation should exemplify compassion.
P2. Exemplifying compassion entails following the
Golden Rule in the treatment of all persons.
C. Therefore, conservation should follow the Golden
Rule in its treatment of all persons.
Conservation should prioritize
compassion to humans.
Compassion should extend to all
sentient beings.
P1. Conservation should treat persons with compassion.
P2. All sentient animals are persons.
C. Therefore, conservation should treat all sentient
animals with compassion.
harmed to protect biodiversity (Table 1). To reflect these
qualifications, the argument can be expanded:
P1. The goal of conservation is to protect biodiversity.
(ethical)
P2. Protecting biodiversity means protecting native
species. (ethical)
P3. Actions directed toward nonhuman animals that are
necessary to achieve the goal of conservation are ap-
propriate. (ethical)
P4. Conservation actions that harm nonhuman animals
can be necessary to protect native species. (empirical)
C. Therefore, conservation actions that harm nonhuman
animals can be appropriate.
This argument encapsulates the first key objection to
compassionate conservation (Table 1). Premise 1 is both
descriptive and ethical. It articulates what conservation
aims to achieve (protect biodiversity) and, in so doing,
identifies something considered of value (biodiversity).
Premise 1 can be considered true and appropriate,
and a starting point of agreement between critics and
supporters of compassionate conservation. However, the
ethical positions expressed in P2 and P3 are contestable.
Premise 2 reflects nativist and collectivist orientations
by stipulating that only native species are worthy of
conservation concern. Nativism is an influential but con-
tested view (e.g., Chew & Hamilton 2011; Bhattacharyya
& Larson 2014; Sandbrook et al. 2019; Gbedomon
et al. 2020) that classifies and values nonhuman species
based on their association, or lack thereof, with (usually
Western) humans (Marris 2013). Collectivism, in turn,
subsumes the value of individual nonhuman lives
(both native and not) to the value of their species.
Premise 3 then represents the instrumentalist assertion
that measures directed against nonhuman animals are
justified when necessary to achieve the assumed greater
good of conservation (and when following accepted
animal welfare protocols) (Table 1).
Premises 2 and 3, and their underlying orientations,
highlight a core fissure between compassionate con-
servation and its critics. By advocating objectifying and
lethal methods, critics of compassionate conservation
withhold the ethical status of personhood from sentient
nonhuman animals, even those with known cognitive
and emotional sophistication. Compassionate conserva-
tionists, in contrast, take seriously that all sentient beings
are persons, who should not be reduced to symbols of
anthropogenic influence or treated as instances of a
type whose lives may be bartered for the collective
good. Rather, they should be regarded and treated
compassionately, as subjects and unique individuals who
have interests of their own (Table 2).
Although our main interest here is in underlying
conceptual claims, we also question the empirical claim,
expressed in P4, that harmful tactics are necessary
to achieve existing conservation goals. Most lethal
programs are not evidence based or even monitored
(e.g., Reddiex & Forsyth 2007; Dubois et al. 2017;
Doherty et al. 2019). Many lethal programs are known to
fail or exacerbate extinction risk by disrupting social and
trophic interactions (e.g., Wanless et al. 2007; Bergstrom
et al. 2009; Wallach et al. 2010); curtailing emergent eco-
logical dependencies (Schlaepfer et al. 2011); harming
species that now thrive only outside their native ranges
(Wallach et al. 2020); and overlooking the underlying
human-caused ecological changes shaping species inter-
actions that result in extinctions (Doherty et al. 2015).
Additionally, and importantly, the normalization of lethal
programs crowds out motivation to invest in research on
compassionate alternatives (Dubois et al. 2017).
Response to Claim that Conservation is already
Compassionate to Animals
Compassionate conservationists argue that only those
conservation actions treating sentient beings with com-
passion are ethically appropriate (Wallach et al. 2018).
Conservation Biology
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Critics respond that invasive and lethal conservation
programs are already compassionate because they
minimize nonhuman suffering overall (Table 1). For
example, Driscoll and Watson (2019) “want to preserve
a morality that values endemic species and that goes
beyond the bullet or bait to the unseen suffering caused
by taking no action to control invasive species.” The first
formalized argument is as follows:
P1. A conservation action is compassionate if it mini-
mizes suffering. (ethical)
P2. Invasive and lethal conservation programs often min-
imize suffering. (empirical)
C. Therefore, invasive and lethal conservation programs
are often compassionate.
It is important to carefully consider how compas-
sion is being characterized. Critics who claim lethal
conservation programs, such as poisoning foxes and
aerial gunning wild horses (Driscoll & Watson 2019),
are compassionate (Table 1) mean they minimize
suffering of nonhuman animals that are harmed to
achieve conservation objectives (e.g., by selecting faster
acting poisons and sharper shooters and aiming to
avert suffering that can arise in the absence of lethal
programs) (Hampton et al. 2019). This is not how the
term is applied in compassionate conservation.
Compassion literally means to suffer with. Emotionally,
compassion engenders care and concern for the well-
being of others (Goetz et al. 2010). Ethically, compassion
can be understood as a virtue: a disposition of good char-
acter manifested by receptivity and responsiveness (San-
dler & Cafaro 2005). Compassion spurs one to recognize
another as a person: as an intrinsically and uniquely valu-
able individual whose interests kindle one’s concern and
respect. It is helpful to think of a compassionate person
as one who strives to follow the Golden Rule, a maxim
of reciprocity (“treat others as you wish to be treated”)
found in various forms across cultures, languages,
religions, and ethical traditions (Küng 1993; Gensler
2013). A compassionate conservationist would generally
strive to minimize suffering, but not by intentionally
harming other persons. Indeed, no one would consider
lethal control of human populations compassionate
irrespective of the rationale, method, or even outcome.
Critics, therefore, equivocate on the word compassion
by offering a different and abridged meaning (Table 2).
Other critics assert that lethal conservation programs
are appropriate where they decrease aggregate suffer-
ing, making their case on grounds of animal welfare
consequentialism, rather than compassion (Table 1). It is
beyond our scope here to make a case for compassion
over (or perhaps alongside) consequentialism, but we
dispute the claim that lethal conservation programs
decrease overall suffering.
Conservation does not aim to reduce suffering per
se, nor does it aim to change fundamental evolutionary
processes, a view considered widely appropriate across
animal and environmental ethics (e.g., Callicott 1988;
Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011). Harm, pain, and death
are integral to life. However, critics claim suffering is
“[outside] natural evolutionary processes” (Driscoll &
Watson 2019) when instigated by organisms whose
occurrence or densities result from human activity.
These critics also suggest that such forms of suffering
can be minimized by lethal programs (Table 1). The
second formalized argument is as follows:
P1. Populations augmented by human activity are unnat-
ural. (ethical)
P2. Some unnatural populations increase suffering. (em-
pirical)
C. Therefore, removing these unnatural populations will
decrease suffering.
Premise 1 refers to wildlife populations that, due to hu-
man influence, are “deemed foreign, nonnative, invasive,
or feral… and therefore harmful to biodiversity” (Hamp-
ton et al. 2019). Put differently, populations influenced
by humans are considered external to biodiversity (Wal-
lach et al. 2020). This notion presupposes a belief not
only that humans are distinct from and outside of nature,
but also that they have the power to transform otherwise
natural (nonhuman) entities into a distinct class of un-
natural (humanized) entities. In this way, all species are
defined and valued based on their relationships with hu-
mans. Compassionate conservation rejects this premise,
calling conservationists to decenter humans from the
stories of nonhuman persons by recognizing that they
have their own interests and experiences, independent
of their interactions with humans (Table 2).
Premise 2 then claims that some unnatural populations
cause increased suffering, of the sort that is of moral
concern for humans (e.g., differentiating between a
bird’s suffering when predated upon by a native versus a
non-native cat). Premise 2 is difficult if not impossible to
verify. Even if we accept the distinction between natural
and unnatural populations, substantiating P2 would
require comparing the amounts and types of suffering
experienced by a range of organisms in similar systems,
with and without the so-called unnatural population.
Although unique kinds of animal welfare harms can
certainly occur in anthropogenically influenced ecolog-
ical systems (e.g., Finn & Stephens 2017; Jiguet et al.
2019), there is no reason to assume a direct association
between suffering and the unnaturalness of the system.
Thus, rigorous evidence is lacking to support P2.
Finally, even if P1 and P2 were incontestable, they do
not necessarily support the conclusion. As a basic rule
of deduction, even when one knows if [A], then [B],
one cannot infer if not [A], then not [B]. For example,
just from the statement if [it rains], then [wet grass] one
cannot conclude if [no rain], then [no wet grass] (maybe
the sprinkler is running). Thus, from if [unnatural
Conservation Biology
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populations] then [more suffering], one cannot neces-
sarily conclude, if [not unnatural populations] then [not
more suffering]. The opposite is just as likely. Conser-
vation control and eradication programs fracture social
and trophic relationships, often perpetuating the harms
these programs aim to resolve and creating additional
and severe pain, trauma, and grief (e.g., Bradshaw et al.
2005; Ferdowsian et al. 2011; O’Neill et al. 2017).
Response to Claim that Conservation Should
Prioritize Compassion to Humans
Compassionate conservationists call for inclusion of
all sentient beings in conservation’s moral community
(Ramp & Bekoff 2015; Wallach et al. 2018). Critics allege
that such an approach would encourage indifference
toward humans (Oommen et al. 2019). Their reasoning
is summarized as follows:
P1. Conservation actions should treat humans with com-
passion. (ethical)
P2. Treating nonhumans with compassion can preclude
treating humans with compassion. (empirical)
C. Therefore, in these cases, conservation actions should
not treat nonhumans with compassion.
Premise 1 is uncontroversial among compassionate
conservationists and their critics. We agree that conser-
vationists should demonstrate compassion for humans
by refraining from actions that infringe on their vital in-
terests. However, Oommen et al. (2019) acknowledge no
parallel requirement to treat sentient nonhuman beings
with compassion, which in their view would express
“moral extensionism or humanization of wild animals
and the artificial attribution of moral standing to nonhu-
man[s]” (Oommen et al. 2019). This critique arbitrarily
restricts moral standing to members of Homo sapiens,
discounting unequivocal scientific evidence that many
nonhuman animals possess morally relevant traits,
including not only sentience, but also, for example, intel-
ligence, emotion, self-awareness, and the ability to form
meaningful relationships (Bekoff & Pierce 2017). Recog-
nition of these qualities and their ethical implications is
increasingly influencing society (e.g., van Eeden et al.
2019; Manfredo et al. 2020). Thus, we would respond
to Oommen et al. (2019) that failure to engage in “moral
extensionism” signifies a dogmatic denial of evidence.
Premise 2 alleges that compassion for other sentient
beings can foster misanthropy or apathy toward human
suffering. To back this claim, critics point to cases
where animal protection is used to advance oppressive
and violent political regimes (Oommen et al. 2019).
These examples are red herrings. The mobilization of
so-called animal protection for nationalistic and racist
purposes is premised on the objectification of animals,
not compassion for animals (Narayanan 2019).
Evidence suggests that humans who disparage or vi-
olate animals are more likely to treat humans similarly.
Both philosophical (Horta 2010) and psychological re-
search has associated human exceptionalism with other
prejudices (e.g., racism). Human exceptionalism and in-
terhuman prejudices can be mutually reinforcing, possi-
bly because both are predicated on upholding strict hier-
archies and binary social categorizations (Jackson 2019).
Caviola et al. (2019) found positive correlations between
human exceptionalism and racism, sexism, and homo-
phobia and negative correlations with empathetic con-
cern. Dhont et al. (2014) found that a social dominance
orientation drives supremacist attitudes toward both
nonhuman animals and ethnic minorities. These studies
caution that objectifying nonhuman animals can counter-
act both human and nonhuman rights agendas (Kymlicka
2018). Park and Valentino (2019) found that support for
animal rights is associated with higher levels of support
for the human rights of disadvantaged groups at individ-
ual and state policy levels, suggesting that moral concern
for humans and other animals is mutually reinforcing.
A world with few moral persons is easier to navigate
because any conflict between competing interests can
be brought to a swift resolution by prioritizing those
few who are included in one’s moral community. A more
inclusive moral community creates a more complex
moral terrain. Compassionate conservation recognizes a
moral community populated by human and nonhuman
persons, aiming to attend to all persons and their claims,
even when they conflict (Table 2). Certainly, in some
situations, it can be challenging to find ideal solutions.
Even in the strictly human domain, it can be difficult or
impossible to fulfill all moral obligations (Batavia et al.
2020). However, the conclusion that conservationists
should simply renounce compassion for nonhuman
animals in cases of conflict is inconsistent with the
understanding of compassion as a virtue. It makes no
sense to suggest a person who is compassionate by
disposition should selectively withhold compassion
in cases of conflict. Compassion becomes even more
important under such circumstances as a caring response
to any harm regretfully enacted against fellow persons.
Discussion
Although the belief that nonhuman animals have some
moral standing may be broadly shared among conserva-
tionists, compassionate conservation is distinguished by
the recognition of nonhuman personhood. Proponents
call to include all sentient beings as persons in conser-
vation’s moral community through the cultivation of
compassion (Ramp & Bekoff 2015; Wallach et al. 2018).
Critics of compassionate conservation generally deny
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the personhood of all beings but humans by calling for
the continuation of programs that harm sentient beings,
who are often intelligent, emotional, and social, for the
perceived greater good of conservation.
On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good
reasons to extend personhood to nonhuman animals
(Midgley 1985; Rose 2011; Dayan 2018). The burden
of proof should no longer lie with those who seek
to expand conservation’s moral community, but with
those who wish to enforce narrow boundaries (Laham
2009). For compassionate conservationists, sentience is
sufficient grounds to recognize personhood. Others may
believe that different qualities are morally relevant, and
we invite ongoing dialogue on this important topic. But
as a starting point, personhood should not be a status au-
tomatically limited to humans. Holding humans separate
and aloft from the rest of the living world has legitimated
the historic and ongoing exploitation of the more-than-
human world, which is arguably the reason conservation
was needed in the first place (Plumwood 1993).
Opposition to compassionate conservation is often
linked to the legitimate concern that at times conserva-
tionists are faced with difficult choices: harm individuals
or lose species (Rohwer & Marris 2019). Under such
tragic circumstances, it is not clear that any decision
can be made with moral impunity (Batavia et al. 2020).
Our most quotidian moments harm sentient beings,
and choices must be made that inevitably prioritize
some over others. How then is one to act ethically if
every act holds the potential to harm fellow persons?
There is no easy answer (Batavia et al. 2020). But if one
takes seriously the notion that all sentient beings are
persons, forming and pursuing conservation objectives
founded on mass killing would become inconceivable.
The default of domination would be replaced with a
default of compassion. This does not mean that one
never harms a person nor that there cannot be variations
in our obligations to different persons (Plumwood 2008;
Robinson 2014). Between perfectly equal moral status
for all and categorical moral segregation of the few lies
a wide expanse where a more inclusive and contextual
moral terrain can be explored.
Conservationists who restrict personhood to humans
may still attribute other animals some degree of moral
standing. For example, Hayward et al. (2019) state, “most
mainstream conservationists are keen to embrace ethical
concern for individual animals as an important element
in conservation best practices, but only to the extent that
it is consistent with landscape-level methods of protect-
ing native biodiversity.” In other words, the “compassion-
ate tail [should not] wag the conservation dog” (Hayward
et al. 2019). For compassionate conservationists, this is
not good enough. Relegating compassion to a virtue to
be dragged behind action (or worse, to be docked) does
little to limit the entrenched violence regularly enacted
against sentient beings in conservation programs. Be-
yond simply replacing lethal tools with nonlethal tools to
achieve the same ends, compassionate conservation chal-
lenges the very agendas and logics underlying conserva-
tion. For example, rather than merely asking how biodi-
versity can be protected from feral cats with nonlethal
tools, one is able to ask what is revealed when feral cats
are accepted as part of biodiversity (Wallach et al. 2020).
That no clean biological or evolutionary boundary
separates humans from other animals is widely accepted,
yet a stark ethical dualism persists, and abandoning it
remains an almost unthinkable proposition. Some sug-
gest that compassionate conservation is too subversive
to even be allowed space at the table, going so far as
to proclaim that “compassionate conservation is not
conservation” (Driscoll & Watson 2019). Such a diktat
risks harming the open exchange of ideas on which
scholarship depends. If conservation’s sole purpose
is to protect native ecological collectives with little
regard for other moral claims, then it is fair to say that
neither compassionate conservation, the wider academic
community, nor prevailing social values are aligned with
conservation (van Eeden et al. 2019; Gbedomon et al.
2020; Manfredo et al. 2020). The time has come to
change this entrenched definition of conservation. As
Deborah Bird Rose (2011) said, “animals haunt the West-
ern imagination, a haunting entailed by and sustained
through our long-lasting, but now crumbling, dualisms.”
Prevailing social values are shifting to align with views
promoted by compassionate conservation (Manfredo
et al. 2020). The moral recognition of personhood for
nonhuman animals is even beginning to influence law.
In 2019, an orangutan named Sandra was the first to
be released from a zoo following Argentina’s ground-
breaking legal recognition of nonhuman personhood.
Addressing the press, Judge Elena Liberatori stated,
“with that ruling I wanted to tell society something new:
that animals are sentient beings and that the first right
they have is our obligation to respect them” (BBC 2019).
The implications of these societal shifts are not trivial for
conservation.
Compassionate conservation is not a challenge to con-
servation per se, but a good-faith response to growing
societal recognition worldwide that nonhuman animals
feel, that they have lives, experiences, and relationships
that matter to them, and that should matter to us (e.g.,
European-Parliament 2010; Kansal 2016; Africa-Union
2017; Bruskotter et al. 2019; van Eeden et al. 2019;
Manfredo et al. 2020). It is not farfetched to suggest
that changing social values makes the transition to
more compassionate forms of conservation unavoidable.
Compassion sits at the heart of many religious and
ethical traditions—not because it is obvious or simple,
but precisely because it is difficult and demanding. We
embrace compassion for its ability to bridge between
ourselves and Earth’s great diversity of persons. Compas-
sionate conservation offers a way forward, to seize the
Conservation Biology
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challenges and opportunities that rise in the dust of our
crumbling dualisms.
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